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Abstract. Witness reports are a key building block for reputation systems in
open multi-agent systems in which agents, that are owned by a variety of stake-
holders, continuously enter and leave the system. However, in such open and
dynamic environments, these reports can be inaccurate because of the differing
views of the reporters. Moreover, due to the conﬂicting interests that stem from
the multiple stakeholders, some witnesses may deliberately provide false infor-
mation to serve their own interests. Now, in either case, if such inaccuracy is not
recognised and dealt with, it will adversely affect the function of the reputation
model. To this end, this paper presents a generic method that detects inaccuracy
in witness reports and updates the witness’s credibility accordingly so that less
credence is placed on its future reports. Our method is empirically evaluated and
is shown to help agents effectively detect inaccurate witness reports in a variety of
scenarios where various degrees of inaccuracy in witness reports are introduced.
1 Introduction
A wide variety of networked computer systems (such as the Grid, the Semantic Web,
and peer-to-peer systems) can be viewed as multi-agent systems (MAS) in which the in-
dividual components act in an autonomous and ﬂexible manner in order to achieve their
objectives [3]. An important class of these systems are those that are open; here deﬁned
assystemsinwhichagentscanfreelyjoinandleaveatanytimeandwheretheagentsare
owned by various stakeholders with different aims and objectives. From these two fea-
tures, it can be assumed that in open MAS: (1) the agents are likely to be self-interested
and may be unreliable; (2) no agent can know everything about its environment; and (3)
no central authority can control all the agents. Given such uncertainties, trust is central
to effective interactions between the agents [5]. Indeed this recognition accounts for
the large number of recently developed models of trust and reputation (see [5] for a re-
view). Although there are many differences in the way these models are implemented,
the majority of them are built upon some form of witness reports (information about
an agent’s behaviour from a third-party). However, a key problem in this area, and one
that is exacerbated in open MAS, is that these reports can be inaccurate. This can hap-
pen because of the differing views of the reporters. However, it can also happen due to
the conﬂicting interests that stem from the multiple stakeholders (e.g. some witnesses
may deliberately provide false information to serve their own interests). In both cases,
witness reports that differ from the actual performance an agent receives are viewed asinaccurate and their inaccuracy1 is reﬂected by the magnitude of the differences. Now,
since these reports are central building blocks for reputation systems, if their inaccuracy
is not recognised and dealt with, it will adversely affect the function of these systems.
Worse still, they may become a means for malicious agents to gain unwarranted trust
which may then allow them to beneﬁt to the detriment of others.
Given its importance, there have been several attempts to tackle the inaccurate wit-
ness reports problem (see Sect. 4), but none of them are well suited to open MAS. In
particular, in order to operate as intended, they typically make assumptions about the
target environment that are incompatible with the characteristics of open MAS or they
require additional domain knowledge that clearly limits their applicability (see Sect. 4
for examples). To this end, we devise a witness credibility model that can be used by
trust and reputation models in open MAS. In so doing, we advance the state of the art
in the following ways. First, our model is able to recognise inaccurate reports based on
an agent’s own experience, and, therefore, no addition domain knowledge is required.
As a result, an agent is able to keep track of the quality of a witness’s reports and assess
that witness’s credibility accordingly. Second, based on witness credibility, our model
provides a witness rating weight function so that the likely accuracy of witness reports
can be taken into account when an agent’s reputation is produced from them. Hence,
lying witnesses can quickly be detected and their reports disregarded. Third, of particu-
lar relevance is the generic nature of our approach. Our model can be used for handling
inaccurate reports in any trust model. Speciﬁcally, in this paper, its integration with the
FIRE model [2] is given as an example of its usage, but the model is not restricted to
this case. Since this paper focuses only on modelling and dealing with witness inac-
curacy, we are not going to consider other design issues of a trust model. We simply
assume that our model is to be applied in a working trust model that is able to evaluate
trust based on experiences from direct interactions and to collect and evaluate witness
reputation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we will
present our witness credibility model. The model will then be empirically evaluated in
Section 3. Section 4 presents related work in the area. Finally, Section 5 concludes and
outlines the future work.
2 Witness credibility model
As our witness credibility model will be integrated into FIRE in order to provide a
concrete grounding for its operation, we will brieﬂy recap the FIRE model in Sect. 2.1,
before going onto present the witness credibility model in Sect. 2.2.
1 It should be noted that in this context inaccuracy is according to the view of the agent receiving
witnessreports.Itdoesnotreﬂectthetruehonesty/accuracyofawitnessagent.Ratheritshould
be viewed as the subjective measure of the usefulness of witness information provided by that
witness which is assessed by a particular agent.2.1 The FIRE model
This section describes the Interaction Trust (IT) and the Witness Reputation (WR)
components of FIRE2. The detailed description and justiﬁcation for the various de-
sign choices that have been made are given in [2]. The IT and WR component although
given here in the context of FIRE are broadly similar to a range of other trust compo-
nents (see [5] for examples). Therefore, the use of our witness credibility model is not
restricted to FIRE.
Interaction Trust. This is the trust that ensues from direct interactions between two
agents. Speciﬁcally, it is derived from the experience of the agents about the perfor-
mance or behaviour of their partners in those interactions. Such experience is recorded
in the form of ratings which are tuples of the following form: r = (a;b;i;c;v); where
a and b are the agents that participated in interaction i, and v is the rating a gave b for
the term c (e.g. price, quality, delivery). The range of v is [¡1;+1], where ¡1, +1, and
0 means absolutely negative, absolutely positive, and neutral respectively.
In order to calculate IT, an agent needs to record its past ratings in a (local) rating
database which stores at maximum the H latest ratings the agent gave to each of its part-
ners after interactions. Here H is called the local rating history size. When assessing the
IT of agent b with respect to term c, agent a retrieves the set of relevant ratings (de-
noted by RI(a;b;c)) from its rating database. The IT value of b, denoted by TI(a;b;c),
is given by the following formula:
TI(a;b;c) =
P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !I(ri) ¢ vi
P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !I(ri)
(1)
where !I(ri) is the rating weight function that calculates the relevance or the reliability
of the rating ri with respect to IT, and vi is the value of the rating ri.
Since older ratings may become out-of-date, recency of the ratings is used as the
rating weight. Speciﬁcally, !I(ri) is a parameterised exponential decay function calcu-
lated from the time difference between the current time and the time when the rating ri
was recorded ¢t(ri):
!I(ri) = e¡
¢t(ri)
¸ (2)
where ¸, the recency factor, is the parameter used to adjust the rating weight function
to suit the time unit used in a particular application.
In FIRE, each trust value comes with a reliability value that reﬂects the conﬁdence
of FIRE in producing that trust value given the data it took into account. The reliability
value is given based on the two following measures:
– ½RI(a;b;c) is a function that calculates the reliability of TI(a;b;c) based on the
reliability (or the relevance) of all the ratings taken into account3, which is given
2 FIRE also has other trust components but we do not consider them in this paper because they
are not affected by inaccurate witness reports.
3 Here in ½RI, ½ stands for reliability, R for rating quality, and I for IT.by the function !I(ri) (by its deﬁnition):
½RI (a;b;c) = 1 ¡ e
¡°I¢
³P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !I(ri)
´
(3)
where °I is a parameter used to adjust the slope of the reliability function to suit the
rating weight function of each component.
– ½DI(a;b;c) is a reliability measure based on the variability of the rating values4.
The greater the variability, the more volatile the other agent’s behaviour. Hence,
½DI(a;b;c) is calculated as the deviation in the ratings’ values:
½DI(a;b;c) = 1 ¡ 1
2 ¢
P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !(ri)¢jvi¡TI(a;b;c)j
P
ri2RI(a;b;c) !(ri) ; (4)
Finally, the reliability of TI(a;b;c), denoted as ½I(a;b;c), combines the two reliability
measures above:
½I(a;b;c) = ½RI(a;b;c) ¢ ½DI(a;b;c) (5)
Witness Reputation. This is built on observations about the behaviour of the target
agent b by others (witnesses). Thus, in order to evaluate the WR of b, an agent a needs
to ﬁnd the witnesses that have interacted with b. In this component, FIRE employs a
variant of the referral system in [8] to ﬁnd such witnesses. In that system, each agent
maintains a list of acquaintances (other agents that it knows). Then when looking for
a certain piece of information, an agent can send the query to a number of its acquain-
tances who will try to answer the query if possible or, if they cannot, they will send
back referrals pointing to other agents that they believe are likely to have the desired
information (see [2] for more details).
After the set of witness ratings is collected through the referral process, they will
then be aggregated using the same method as per the IT component into a WR value
(denoted by TW(a;b;c)). The accompanying reliability value, denoted by ½RW(a;b;c),
and the rating weight function, !W(ri), are also deﬁned as per the IT component. This
means that accurate and inaccurate ratings are treated equally. However, as discussed
in Sect. 1, this means malicious agents may take advantage of this to gain unwarranted
trust. In order to prevent this type of exploitation, unreliable witnesses should be de-
tected and disregarded, and this requires us to devise a new rating weight function for
the WR component that takes into account the credibility of witnesses (see Sect. 2.2).
Overall trust. This is produced by combining the trust values from all the various
components of FIRE to give an overall picture of an agent’s likely performance. The
composite trust value (denoted by T (a;b;c)) and its reliability (denoted by ½T (a;b;c))
are calculated as follows:
T (a;b;c) =
wI ¢ TI(a;b;c) + wW ¢ TW(a;b;c)
wI + wW
(6)
4 Here, D in ½DI stands for the deviation of the rating values.½T (a;b;c) =
wI + wW
WI + WW
(7)
where wK = WK ¢½K(a;b;c), and WI and WW are the coefﬁcients corresponding to the
IT and WR components. These coefﬁcients are set by end users to reﬂect the importance
of each component in a particular application.
2.2 Witness credibility
The credibility of a witness in reporting its ratings about another agent can be derived
from a number of sources. These include knowledge about: the relationships between
the witness and the rated agent (e.g. cooperating partners may exaggerate each other’s
performance, competing agents may underrate their opponents, no relationship may im-
ply impartial ratings); the reputation of the witness for being honest and expert in the
ﬁeld in which it is doing the rating (e.g. a reputable and independent ﬁnancial consultant
should provide fair ratings about services of various banks); the relationships between
the witness and the querying agent (e.g. agents with the same owner should provide
honest reports to one another); norms in the witness’s society (e.g. doctors usually rec-
ommendadrugtothebeneﬁtsofpatients,ratherthantothebeneﬁtofitspharmaceutical
companies) and so on. Unfortunately, however, these types of information are very ap-
plication speciﬁc and may not be readily available in many cases. Therefore, although
they could certainly be used to enhance the precision of a witness credibility measure,
they are not suitable as a generic basis (although they could complement a generic mea-
sure in particular contexts).
In contrast, in our witness credibility model we view providing witness reports as
a service an agent provides. Thus its performance (i.e. trustworthiness and reliability)
can be evaluated and predicted by a trust model. By so doing, the credibility model can
beneﬁt from a trust model’s (usually sophisticated) ability of learning and predicting
an agent’s behaviour (in this case, the behaviour of providing accurate reports) with-
out having to implement its own method. Here, we use FIRE’s IT component for this
purpose.
In more detail, after having an interaction with agent b, agent a records its rating
about b’s performance, denoted by ra (ra = (a;b;ia;c;va)). Now, if agent a received
witness reports from agent w, it then rates the credibility of w by comparing the actual
performance of b (i.e. va) with w’s rating about b. The smaller the difference between
the two rating values, the higher agent b is rated in terms of providing witness reports
(mutatis mutandis for bigger differences). For each witness rating that a received from
w in evaluating the WR of b (denoted by rk = (w;b;ik;c;vk)), the credibility rating
value vw for agent w is given in the following formula:
vw =
½
1 ¡ jvk ¡ vaj if jvk ¡ vaj < ¶
¡1 if jvk ¡ vaj ¸ ¶ (8)
where ¶ is the inaccuracy tolerance threshold (0 · ¶ · 2, 2 is the maximal difference
since vk;va 2 [¡1;1]). Thus if the difference between a witness rating value and the
actual performance is higher than ¶, the witness is considered to be inaccurate or lying,
and, therefore, receives a negative rating of ¡1 for its credibility. On the other hand,if the difference is within the tolerance threshold, it can be viewed as resulting from a
subjective viewpoint and is deemed acceptable. In this case, the credibility rating value
vw is set to be inversely proportional to the difference (e.g. higher difference, lower
credibility). Since 0 · jvn ¡ vaj · 2, vw is also in the range [¡1;1] regardless of ¶.
The rating about w’s credibility — rw = (a;w;iw;cWC;vw) — is then recorded in a’s
rating database, where cWC is the rating term of providing witness reports and iw is the
interaction of agent w providing agent a the rating rk about agent b.
Here, as agents whose inaccuracy exceeds the tolerance threshold are considered
lying and are heavily ﬁned (by giving a ¡1 credibility rating), honest witnesses may be
falselypenalisediftheir(honest)ratingsaretoodifferentfromthatofa(e.gsomeagents
may have substantially varying levels of performance which result in varying, though
honest, ratings). However, since in the case of acceptable inaccuracy (jvk ¡ vaj < ¶)
an agent’s credibility is also penalised according to the degree of its inaccuracy (i.e.
jvk ¡ vaj), it is always safe to set ¶ to higher values to reduce the probability of falsely
classifying honest witnesses. Nevertheless, doing so inevitably allows ratings from mar-
ginally lying witnesses be accepted. In such cases, although the credibility of such wit-
nesses may be low, it may never be low enough, or it may take a longer time, for them to
be considered lying and be disregarded (see below). This means, in general, that there
will be a lower performance of the witness credibility model. Therefore, it is important
to choose a threshold value that closely reﬂects the variability of the agents’ perfor-
mance in the target environment and the relative costs of considering lying witnesses
versus falsely classifying them.
Given the availability of credibility ratings from the above procedure, the process
of the WR component is redesigned to make use of these reﬁned ratings. Speciﬁcally,
after the referral process, for each witness rating collected from a witness w, the WR
component uses the IT component to evaluate the interaction trust of w in terms of
providing witness reports. The IT component, in turn, calculates the credibility trust
value of w from ratings about w’s credibility (retrieved from the rating database as per
Sect. 2.1). If no such ratings has been recorded, and, thus, the IT value is not available,
the WR component will assign the default credibility trust value, denoted by TDWC, to
witness b.
TWC(a;w) =
½
TI(a;w;cWC) if RI(a;w;cWC) 6= ;
TDWC otherwise (9)
where TWC(a;w) is the credibility of w evaluated by a. The credibility of witness w is
then used to calculate the weights of ratings provided by w in calculating the WR value
of the target agent b.
Hence, the rating weight function for the WR component, instead of being deﬁned
as in Equation 2, is redeﬁned here as follows. Suppose that agent a is evaluating the
WR of agent b and that the rating ri is collected from witness w, then:
!W(ri) =
½
0 if TWC(a;w) · 0
TWC(a;w) ¢ !I(ri) otherwise (10)
This means the new rating weight function disregards any rating provided by witnesses
that have negative credibility (by giving 0 as the weight for their ratings). The rest are
taken into account in producing the WR of b, but are weighted by the credibility of theirproviders and by their recency (provided by the function !I(ri) of the IT component).
In so doing, ratings from the more accurate witnesses (as judged by the accuracy of
their past ratings) make a bigger impact on the WR value than those from the less
accurate ones. In cases where all the witness ratings collected are disregarded, due to
negative credibility of their providers, the WR component will produce no trust value
(as in the case where it fails to collect witness ratings). In addition, at ﬁrst, every witness
receives the default credibility value since it has not provided witness ratings to agent a
before. Hence, end users can set the value of TDWC to reﬂect their policy towards newly
encountered witnesses. For example, TDWC can be set to 0 so that newly encountered
witnesses are disregarded until they prove to be credible (by providing ratings in the
acceptable accuracy threshold) or it can be set to 1 to reﬂect the policy that all witnesses
are considered to be accurate and honest until proven otherwise.
3 Empirical evaluation
In order to empirical evaluate our new witness credibility model, we use the test bed de-
signedin[2]withminorchangestosimulateinaccuracyofwitnessreports.Inparticular,
the witness credibility model will be tested under various levels of witness accuracy to
determine its efﬁciency in ﬁltering out inaccurate reports. The testbed is described in
Sect. 3.1. The methodology and experimental settings are then presented in Sect. 3.2.
Finally, Sect. 3.3 describes the experiments and discusses their results.
3.1 The testbed
The testbed is a multi-agent system consisting of agents providing services (called
providers) and agents using those services (called consumers). Without loss of gen-
erality, it is assumed that there is only one type of service in the testbed. Hence, all the
provider agents offer the same service. However, their performance (i.e. the quality of
the service) differs. The agents are situated randomly on a spherical world whose radius
is 1:0. Each agent has a radius of operation ro that models its capability in interacting
with others (e.g. the available bandwidth or the agent’s infrastructure) and any agents
situated in that range are its neighbours.
Simulations are run in the testbed in rounds (of agent interactions), and the round
number is used as the time unit. In each round, if a consumer agent needs to use the
service it can contact the environment to locate nearby provider agents (in terms of
the distance between the agents on the spherical world). The consumer agent will then
select one provider from the list to use its service. The selection process relies on the
agent’s trust model to decide which provider is likely to be the most reliable. Consumer
agents without a trust model randomly select a provider from the list. The consumer
agent then uses the service of the selected provider and gains some utility from the
interaction (called UG). The value of UG is in [¡10;10] and depends on the level of
performance of the provider in that interaction. A provider agent can serve many users
at a time.
After an interaction, the consumer agent will rate the service of the provider based
on the level of performance it received. It records the rating for subsequent trust eval-
uations. It is also willing to share those recorded ratings (witness reports) when asked.However, since the witness may alter its actual ratings before giving them to the query-
ing agent, we model this phenomenon by introducing ﬁve types of witnesses. Agents
in the Hon group always reveal their actual ratings truthfully. Those in Neg1 and Neg2,
however, provide to the querying agent ratings that are lower than those they actually
recorded. Conversely, those in Pos1 and Pos2 give falsely higher ratings. The difference
between an actual rating value and its inaccurate one in Neg1 and Pos1 is randomly set
in the range [0:3;1:0] (i.e. representing marginally inaccurate witnesses) and the re-
spective range of Neg2 and Pos2 is [1:0;2:0] (i.e. representing extremely inaccurate
witnesses). In the testbed, we also deﬁne levels of witness inaccuracy at the level of the
overall system (¡100 to 100) so that various conﬁgurations of witness population can
be conveniently referred in our experiments. The proportions of witness types in each
level of witness inaccuracy are given in Fig. 1 (where vertical dotted lines represent
speciﬁc example conﬁgurations of witnesses). For example, level 0 means that all the
witnesses are of the Hon group (and provide their ratings honestly). Level +80 means
that in the witness population, the proportions of Hon, Pos1, and Pos2 are 20%, 40%,
and 40% respectively. It also means that 80% of the witness population is providing
positively exaggerated reports (because 80% of the witnesses are either Pos1 or Pos2).
Similarly, level ¡60 means that 60% of the witness population (30% Neg1, 30% Neg2)
is providing falsely negative reports.
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Fig.1. The proportions of witness types at various levels of witness inaccuracy.
In our testbed, besides the accuracy level of witness reports, the only difference in
each situation is the performance of the provider agents. Here, we consider three types
of provider agents: good, ordinary, and bad. Each of them has a mean level of per-
formance (¹P). Its actual performance follows a normal distribution around this mean.
The values of ¹P and the associated standard deviation (¾P) of these types of providers
are given in Table 1. In addition, the service quality of a provider is also degraded lin-
early in proportion to the distance between it and the consumer to reﬂect the greater
uncertainties associated with service delivery (e.g. lower service quality resulting from
increased delays or losses in information exchanges between two agents when they are
far away from each other). Hence, from the same provider, each consumer may receive
a different level of service quality depending on its location. This means honest rat-
ings about that provider’s performance by its consumers can be different; reﬂecting the
phenomenon that every agent has its own context making its own view subjective.Proﬁle Range of ¹P ¾P
Good [PL GOOD;PL PERFECT] 1:0
Ordinary [PL OK;PL GOOD] 2:0
Bad [PL WORST;PL OK] 2:0
Performance level Utility gained
PL PERFECT 10
PL GOOD 5
PL OK 0
PL BAD ¡5
PL WORST ¡10
Table 1. Proﬁles of provider agents.
3.2 Experimental methodology
In each experiment, the testbed is populated with provider and consumer agents. Each
consumer is equipped with a particular trust model, which helps it select a provider
when it needs to use a service. Since the only difference among consumer agents is
the trust models that they use, the utility gained (UG) by each agent will reﬂect the
performance of its trust model in selecting reliable providers for interactions. Hence,
the testbed records the UG of each interaction along with the trust model used. In order
to obtain an accurate result for performance comparisons between trust models, each
one will be employed by a large number of consumer agents (NC). In addition, the
average UG of agents employing the same trust models (called consumer groups) are
comparedwitheachother’susingthetwo-samplet-test[1](formeanscomparison)with
the conﬁdence level of 95%. The result of an experiment is then presented in a graph
with two y-axes (see Fig. 2 for an example); the ﬁrst plots the UG means of consumer
groups in each interaction and the second plots the corresponding performance rankings
obtained from the t-test (preﬁxed by “R:”, where the group of rank 2 outperforms that
of rank 1). The experimental variables are presented in Table 2 and these will be used
in all experiments unless otherwise speciﬁed.
Simulation variable Symbol Value
Number of simulation rounds N 500
Total number of provider agents: NP 95
+ Good providers NPG 10
+ Ordinary providers NPO 40
+ Bad providers NPB 45
Number of consumers in each group NC 500
Table 2. Experimental variables.
Now, there are three groups of consumers in each experiment: one employing FIRE
(IT and WR components only), one employing the SPORAS model5 (see Sect. 4 for
details), and one consisting of agents with no trust model. We name the three groups
WR, SPORAS, and NoTrust. A summary of the parameters of FIRE is provided in
Table 3. The component coefﬁcients WI and WW are selected to reﬂect the belief that
trust values produced by the IT component are more reliable than those produced from
witness ratings (which are prone to inaccuracy). The recency factor ¸ is selected such
5 SPORAS is chosen as the control benchmark for two reasons. First, it is a successful inde-
pendently developed trust model which several other researchers have used for benchmarking.
Second, other than SPORAS, most notable trust models make assumptions that are incompat-
ible with open MAS, and, thus, they will not operate as intended in our testbed (see Sect. 4 for
more details).that a 5-time-unit-old rating will have a recency weight of 0:5 (to suit the time unit used
in the testbed). The default witness credibility TDWC is set to 0:5 so that all ratings
from newly encountered witnesses will be taken into account in calculating WR but
their weights are smaller than that of any proven accurate witness (which is typically
greater than ¶ = 0:5, see Equation 9) and larger than that of a proven inaccurate one
(whichistypicallynegative).Thevalueof¶ishandpickedbasedontheactualvariability
of honest rating values in the testbed (which never exceeds 0:5).
Parameters Symbol Value
Local rating history size H 10
Recency factor ¸ ¡
5
ln(0:5)
Component coefﬁcients:
+ Interaction trust WI 2:0
+ Witness reputation WW 1:0
Reliability function parameters:
+ Interaction trust °I ¡ln(0:5)
+ Witness reputation °W ¡ln(0:5)
Witness credibility parameters:
+ Default witness credibility TDWC 0.5
+ Inaccuracy tolerance threshold ¶ 0.5
Table 3. FIRE’s parameters.
3.3 The effect of inaccurate reports
In this section, we will look at how various levels of witness inaccuracy affect the
performance of each consumer group. In this experiment, inaccurate witnesses always
provide inaccurate reports. The experiment is run with the following witness inaccuracy
levels: ¡100, ¡80, ..., 0, ..., +80, +100. After plotting the performance of the three
consumer groups in each experiment (Fig. 2), it can be seen that the performance of
NoTrust is consistently low (around ¡1:0). On the other hand, thanks to the trust mod-
els used, the performance of SPORAS and WR are always higher than that of NoTrust.
However, the performance of WR is always superior to that of SPORAS. In this exper-
iment, since the performance of all providers are equally exaggerated, it is still the case
that good providers generally have better ratings than others. Hence, in the ﬁrst few
interactions, they are selected by WR, and this accounts for an increase of WR’s UG in
this period. Now, after several interactions with these providers, WR is able to record
their actual performance, which is generally lower than the reported performance of
the remaining providers (calculated only from falsely positive reports). Thus, remain-
ing providers (i.e. ordinary and bad providers) are then selected in later interactions.
As a result, WR’s UG is decreased. Nevertheless, because of the witness credibility
model, during these interactions, WR is able to realise that all reports are inaccurate,
and, thus, future (false) reports are disregarded. Effectively, WR resorts to the IT com-
ponent for evaluating providers’ trustworthiness. As for SPORAS, since it cannot ﬁlter
out inaccurate reports, it cannot improve its performance over time. Now, due to space
constraints we can only present a general analysis of the large number of experiments
and associated settings that were conducted during the evaluation of this work.In more detail, the chart in Fig. 3 shows the average performance of the three groups
in each experiment with various levels of witness inaccuracy. Here, the average perfor-
mance of each group is calculated as the average utility gained in each interaction of an
agent in that group. This average performance is calculated from data of the ﬁrst 200
interactions in each experiment (by which time the average UG of all groups is stable
in all experiments).
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Fig.3. Performance of NoTrust, SPORAS, and WR at various levels of inaccuracy.
From Fig. 3, it can be seen that the performance of both WR and SPORAS suffer
as the witness inaccuracy increases (as we would expect). However, the performance
of WR is more robust. In particular, SPORAS suffers greatly from exaggerated positive
ratings (because of the reason mentioned above). On the other hand, although WR also
suffers from false positive ratings at the beginning (see Fig. 2), it can gradually learn
and disregard inaccurate witnesses and, generally speaking, it maintains a high perfor-
mance.Inthecasesoffalselynegativeratings(seeFig.3,witnessinaccuracylevel¡100
to ¡20), SPORAS does not suffer as much as in the cases of exaggerated positive rat-
ings. The reason is that falsely negative ratings not only lower the rating values of good
providers, but also lower those of bad and ordinary ones by similar amounts. Hence, it
is still the case that good providers have better reputations in SPORAS, and, thus, they
are more likely to be selected for interaction. This means that SPORAS can perform
normally in scenarios where all lying witnesses provide negative ratings. However, this
is because of the nature of that speciﬁc lying population rather than SPORAS’s abilityof dealing with inaccurate reports. As for WR, as mentioned above, its ability to de-
tect and penalise inaccurate witnesses also works in such scenarios and allows WR to
maintain a generally high performance.
Fig.4. Lying 25% of the time.
Fig.5. Lying 75% of the time.
Next, we seek to determine whether our model can cope with situations where wit-
nesses have more subtle lying behaviour — they lie sometimes and provide their honest
ratings at other times. Here, we investigate two scenarios: the lying witnesses provide
false ratings: (1) 25% of the time (i.e. being mostly honest, lying sometimes) and (2)
75% of the time (i.e. mostly lying, being honest sometimes). The two cases are interest-
ing because some agents may try to fool a reputation system by lying only a few times
to maintain their credibility (case 1) or by giving reports honestly to increase its (bad)
credibility (case 2). The set of experiments are rerun for the two scenarios and their
results are presented in Figures 4 and 5. From these, it can be seen that the performance
of all groups have a broadly similar pattern in scenarios of negative lying. However, as
in the scenarios of lying 100% of the time, SPORAS suffers adversely from exagger-
ated positive reports (as in the previous experiment). It can also be seen that SPORAS’s
performance decreases in proportion to the amount of lying (i.e 25%, 75%, 100%).
In contrast, in all scenarios presented, our witness credibility model can learn the wit-
nesses’ lying behaviour (thanks to the adaptive nature of FIRE’s IT component), and
this accounts for the robust performance of WR throughout in these scenarios.4 Related work
Many trust and reputation models have been devised in recent years due to the in-
creasing recognition of their roles in controlling social order in open systems [5]. Now,
SPORAS [9] is one of the notable models. In this model, each agent rates its partner
after an interaction and reports its ratings to the centralised SPORAS repository. The
ratings received are then used to update the global reputation values of the rated agents.
The model uses a learning function for the updating process so that the reputation value
can closely reﬂect an agent’s performance. In addition, it also introduces a reliability
measure based on the standard deviations of the rating values. However, it has been
designed without considering the problem of inaccurate reports and so it suffers dispro-
portionately when false information is collected (as shown in Sect. 3). Speaking more
generally, as many trust models are built on witness reports, the unreliable reporting
problem has come to the fore of several recent works on trust and we explore the most
notably approaches in the remainder of this section.
Regret [6] models a witness’ credibility based on the difference between that wit-
ness’ opinion and an agent’s past experience. In particular, before taking a witness opin-
ion into account, agent a compares that witness opinion with the direct trust it has on
the target agent based on its previous experiences (i.e. Interaction Trust in FIRE). If
both the witness and agent a are conﬁdent about their opinions on the target agent, the
difference between the two opinions (i.e the direct trust of a and w on b) is used to
determine the credibility of that witness. The higher the difference, the less credible
the witness is. Then the witness’s credibility is used to weight that witness’s opinion
in aggregating it with those of other witnesses. Now, although this method appears to
be similar to our approach, there are two important differences. First, suppose agent a
receives an opinion from witness w about agent b, in order determine w’s credibility for
future interactions, our model compares w’s opinion with the actual performance of b
after a interacts with b, not with a’s past experiences about b before the interaction (as
in Regret). This allows agent a to determine the credibility of w without depending on
the availability of its past experiences with b6. More importantly, in our model, in the
case that b changes its behaviour and a’s experience about b becomes out-of-date, w’s
credibility will not be judged based on out-of-date information (as it would be if Regret
is used). Second, our model views providing witness information as a normal service
and assess a witness’ performance (i.e. its credibility) in all its (witness information
providing) interactions whenever its information is used. By so doing, a witness’ cred-
ibility is deduced from the history of its service, not just a single assessment as in the
case of Regret. Alternatively, Regret also uses fuzzy rules to deduce the weight for each
witness rating. However, agents are assumed to have a social network that models the
social relationships in the agent’s world. Then, in order to determine the trustworthiness
of a witness, Regret applies simple rules over the relationships between the witness and
6 In addition, Regret requires that both a and w are conﬁdent about their assessment of b’s
performance in order to determine the credibility of w. This, in turn, requires a and w to
have a sufﬁcient number of ratings about b. In our opinion, if a is already conﬁdent about its
assessment of b’s performance, witness reputation is less important. This view is also adopted
by Regret considering its method of combining direct trust and its various types of reputation.the target agent (e.g. cooperating or competing). Thus, this approach requires signiﬁ-
cantly more knowledge about the agent environment than our model and, moreover, no
evaluation has been presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of their method.
Jurca and Faltings [4] attempt to eliminate the lying witness problem by introduc-
ing a reputation mechanism such that the agents are incentivised to share their ratings
truthfully. However, in so doing, they also introduce a payment scheme for witness
reports that requires an independent monetary system and this may not always be avail-
able in the context we consider. Moreover, their reputation information is managed by
third-party agents which cannot be guaranteed to be entirely impartial due to the self-
interested character of an open MAS.
In Whitby et al.’s system [7] the “true” rating of an agent is deﬁned by the majority’s
opinions. In particular, they model the performance of an agent as a beta probability
density function (PDF) which is aggregated from all witness ratings received. Then a
witness is considered unreliable and ﬁltered out when the reputation derived from its
ratings is judged to be too different from the majority’s (by comparing the reputation
value with the PDF). Since this method bases it decisions entirely on PDFs of witness
reports, if these reports are scarce and/or too diverse it will not be able to recognise
lying witnesses. Moreover, it is possible that a witness can lie in a small proportion of
their reports without being ﬁltered out.
Yu and Singh [8] propose a similar approach to that of Whitby et al. Speciﬁcally,
they use a weighted majority algorithm to adjust the weight for each witness over time.
Although the weights of the deceitful agents are reduced, these agents are never disre-
garded completely. Several successful applications of this approach have been demon-
strated, but only for agent populations where deceitful agents are in the minority and
are balanced between negative and positive lying agent.
In sum, in contrast to the above mentioned models, our witness credibility model
does not require additional domain knowledge, makes no assumptions about the envi-
ronment, and is evaluated in a broad range of scenarios.
5 Conclusions and future work
This paper has presented a novel model of witness credibility which is designed to
recognise inaccurate reports and ensure that they are disregarded in making assessments
about reputation. Moreover, our model also ensures accurate witnesses are recognised
and that their information is highly valued. Through empirical evaluation, we show that
our model helps FIRE ﬁlter out inaccurate reports and perform robustly in a variety of
scenarios of inaccuracy. Moreover, our witness credibility model can be adjusted to suit
an agent’s stance/policy to witness reports via its parameters (i.e. the default witness
credibility and the inaccuracy tolerance threshold). This means it is suitable for a wide
range of applications.
As our model considers witness credibility as an agent’s performance in providing
witness reports, it can be used in any trust model that is able to predict an agent’s per-
formance based on performance ratings. Obviously, this ability is the intended function
of almost all trust models, and, as a result, our model can be used alongside most ex-
isting trust models. Speciﬁcally, in this paper, FIRE’s IT component is employed onlyas a means so that our model can learn about the lying behaviour of witnesses, and its
integration with FIRE is to provide a concrete grounding. It can equally well be plugged
into other models in a similar way.
In future work, we aim to devise a method to automatically adjust the accuracy tol-
erance threshold during the system’s operation (instead of handpicking a value as at
present). This can be achieved by analysing the recorded performance levels of service
providers that an agent has interacted with to determine the likely variability of honest
ratings. By so doing, the inaccuracy can be adjusted to closely reﬂect the actual vari-
ability of performance levels in an agent’s environment, and, as a result, the precision
of inaccuracy detection is improved (e.g. more marginal lying cases can be detected,
and honest witnesses will not be falsely classiﬁed as lying because of an increased ﬂuc-
tuation in a provider’s performance).
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